News and information

Risks to Ireland from incidents at Sellafield
The summary of a report commissioned by the Government of Ireland and produced by a team of US-based experts has recently been released. The summary report states that the information contained in the full report is highly sensitive and that its release in full would add to the risks to both Ireland and the UK. This is because it is understood to include information such as the precise location, types and quantities of nuclear and radioactive materials in storage, details of storage facilities and safety systems, and other information that might be of interest to terrorist groups.
Because the full report remains confidential it is not possible to examine the analyses of the various accident scenarios or the assumptions used in making them. The summary report is available at www.environ.ie/en/PublicationsDocuments/FileDownLoad,31607,en.pdf.
Background
The UK's Sellafield nuclear site, located on the Cumbrian coast, is at its closest point about 180 km from Ireland's coastline. It is currently a collection of facilities that process and store spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive materials. The Low-Level Waste Repository, located close by, stores low-level radioactive waste from all over the UK. Because of the site's location, its history, and the amount and type of radioactive materials stored and handled there, the Government of Ireland and the Irish people have long been concerned about the radiological implications of the facilities on the site. This concern has focused, in particular, on the significant quantities of plutonium (currently some 71 tonnes) and liquid high level radioactive waste produced during reprocessing of spent fuel and in storage awaiting vitrification into glass blocks, as well as discharges, both authorized and accidental, of radioactive effluents into the Irish Sea.
Furthermore in recent years attention has also focused on the Low-Level Waste Repository and the possibility that, due to its location, a rise in sea levels could lead to a release to the Irish Sea of its contents.
In 2000, the competent authority of nuclear safety and radiological protection issues in Ireland, the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland, was given permission by the operators of the site, British Nuclear Fuels Plc, to visit the site and to examine the safety documentation relating to the storage of liquid high level radioactive waste. The report of this examination (RPII 2000) found no cause to contest the analyses of various accident scenarios considered in BNFL's safety documentation. However, as these analyses focused principally on the potential doses to those living close to Sellafield, the RPII team was not in a position to estimate the likely impact on Ireland. Also, for security reasons, the documentation made available to the Items for inclusion in this section are welcomed and should be sent to the Deputy Editor, Jim Gray, at the address given at the front of this issue.
RPII team did not include potential radioactive releases arising from war and/or terrorist attack, an issue which was to become of increasing concern following the terrorist attacks in the US in September 2001. RPII staff have also visited other facilities at Sellafield but these visits were essentially for the purpose of gaining further information on activities undertaken therein.
The Irish Government decided, therefore, to commission an assessment by a team of independent experts to determine the potential risks to Ireland associated with all the main activities at the Sellafield site and the Low-Level Waste Repository located near the site. The team was assembled and engaged by a US law firm that specializes in nuclear energy, nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear waste and related risk-assessment matters.
The assessment team included experts on risk assessment, nuclear facility operations, chemistry, the effects of radiation on people and how organizations perform. The probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) team identified a broad range of potential initiating events that represent the starting points of an accident or incident. These included, for example, equipment failures, natural disasters, and accidents caused by human error or terrorist attack, which could affect current activities at Sellafield or the Low-Level Waste Repository.
PRA was used to determine the probability of occurrence of different incidents and their radiological consequences. This involved the use of computer models, calculations and expert judgment to consider what might happen given certain conditions such as the type of facility, the amount of radioactive material, the kinds of barriers that can prevent the material from being released, the training of the workforce and other factors.
The expert team began by reviewing existing publicly-available technical information regarding activities at the Sellafield site. A subsequent information exchange agreement between the governments of Ireland and the UK provided the technical experts with access to the Sellafield site and additional technical information. However, the UK was not in a position to disclose certain highly sensitive information related to security measures. To limit the impact this lack of security information might have on the analysis, the expert team used additional sources of information such as their own knowledge of operating history and data from similar nuclear facilities. Although many factors about the Sellafield site are unique, individual processes have counterparts elsewhere in industry. In some areas where information was not available, the team used their experience of studying other nuclear facilities around the world to make expert judgments.
Main findings of the assessment
From the PRA it was concluded that an incident at Sellafield or the Low-Level Waste Repository would result in no observable health effects in Ireland.
The PRA was used to calculate the consequences from three different realistic release scenarios where radioactive materials could be transported significant distances beyond the site boundary and potentially reach Ireland. A companion calculation considered a release of a portion of the contents of a storage tank containing among the most highly concentrated radioactive materials. The analysis showed that some radioactive materials could reach Ireland but at levels far below the dose levels that could cause observable health effects and well below the level of background radiation people normally receive each year. For all other PRA scenarios, doses would be much lower.
The expert team also examined a very long-term event where, hundreds of years from now, rising sea levels and severe coastal storms could cause the entire contents of the Low Level Waste Repository to be released into the Irish Sea. The expert team concluded that due to a combination of the fact that the contents of the repository would have decayed significantly by that time and dilution by seawater, radioactivity levels in seawater would be barely detectable anywhere near the coast of Ireland.
The report did, however, accept that some accidents involving releases of significant quantities of radioactivity could have a significant negative socioeconomic impact on, for example, fishing and tourism.
The report of the assessment also concluded that there is a 16% probability that one of the incident scenarios considered may occur at some time during the next 100 years, which implies that there is an 84% probability that none of them will occur during the same period.
Implications of the report for Ireland
The Government of Ireland and many individuals and pressure groups have for many years regularly voiced their opposition to the activities at Sellafield and indeed to nuclear activities in general including the use of nuclear power. It will be interesting to see what impact, if any, the findings of the report have on public opinion on such activities.
